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ARTICLES
THE YUKOS ANNULMENT:
ANSWERED AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
George A. Bermann*
On April 20, 2016, a Dutch court issued a major judgment annulling awards
rendered in a dispute between the Russian Federation and three majority
shareholders1 of the former giant Russian oil producer, OAO Yukos Oil Company
(“Yukos”).2 The annulment by a national court of any investor-State award is
always of great moment, but it was particularly so in the case of an award in
excess of $50 billion. Discussion of the judgment has understandably occupied
much of the international arbitration blogosphere.
After setting out the basic facts of the case, this piece briefly describes the
position that the Tribunal had taken and that the Dutch court found sufficiently
flawed to justify the award’s annulment. It then examines the court’s own
reasoning in some detail. Lastly, it shows that, however momentous the
annulment may have been, the Dutch court avoided answering several very
difficult and important questions that it might otherwise have had to address and
that warrent serious consideration.
I.

THE BASIC FACTS

Starting in 2003, the Russian tax authorities charged Yukos with systemic and
large-scale tax evasion. It imposed on Yukos very substantial tax assessments and
fines, and ultimately seized Yukos’ assets, as a result of which Yukos went into
bankruptcy in August 2006. The Yukos shareholders claimed that the Russian
Federation had thereby unlawfully expropriated most of Yukos’ assets, and thus
their protected investment.
The Yukos shareholders (“the Claimants”) initiated three separate arbitral
proceedings at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) in the Hague against
the Russian Federation under Article 26(4)(b) of the Energy Charter Treaty
(“ECT”) 3 and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. After the parties had appointed
their arbitrators, the Secretary-General of the PCA appointed a third arbitrator,
Yves Fortier. Following the replacement in 2007 of one of the arbitrators
* Jean Monnet Professor of European Law and Walter Gellhorn Professor of Law;
Director, Center for International Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Columbia Law
School. The author has filed an expert opinion on behalf of the Russian Federation in the
award enforcement proceeding pending in the federal district court for the District of
Columbia.
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appointed in 2005, the Tribunal consisted of the aforementioned Mr. Fortier
(Chairman), Charles Poncet and Stephen M. Schwebel. The Tribunal was assisted
by Mr. Martin Valasek, described as an “assistant” to the Tribunal. The three
arbitrations were heard in parallel with the full participation of all the Parties at
the relevant stages of the proceedings.
II. THE ARBITRATION AND AWARD
The Russian Federation initially contested the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on the
ground that Russia had not in fact acceded to the ECT and thereby become subject
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In December 1994, the Vice Prime Minister of
the Russian Federation had signed the ECT on behalf of the Federation.
Although the Russian government then presented to the Parliament a bill of
ratification of the ECT, the Parliament never in fact took that action.4 Eventually,
in August 2009, the Russian Federation notified the Portuguese Republic (the
depository State under ECT Article 49) that it would not ratify the ECT.
Complicating matters for Russia, however, is the fact that the ECT expressly
contemplated its “provisional application.” According to ECT Article 45(1):
Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending its entry
into force for such signatory in accordance with Article 44, to the extent
that the provisional application of this Treaty is not inconsistent with its
constitution, laws or regulations.
By its own terms, Article 45(1) was thus subject to an important proviso: the ECT
could receive provisional application5 against a State only “to the extent that
[such] provisional application of this Treaty is not inconsistent with [the State’s]
constitution, laws or regulations.” This proviso was referred to both by the
Tribunal and the Dutch court as Article 45(1)’s “Limitation Clause.”
Article 45(2)(a) then goes on to permit a State to make a declaration upon
signature altogether rejecting provisional application of the ECT:
Notwithstanding paragraph (1), any signatory may, when signing,
[declare] that it is not able to accept provisional application [in which
case], [t]he obligation contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a
signatory making such declaration.

4

According to Article 94 of the Russian Constitution “ratification and denunciation of
international treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation” may only be performed
by the Federal Parliament.
5
Article 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifically
contemplates provisional application of a treaty or certain of its provisions: “A treaty or a
part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if (a) the treaty itself so
provides.”
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All parties appear to have understood Article 45(2) to mean that, upon signing the
ECT, a State may declare that it is unable to accept the Treaty’s provisional
application.
In the arbitration, the Russian Federation contended broadly that, since it had
done nothing more than sign the ECT (i.e. had not ratified it), it could not be
bound by any provisions of the Treaty, including Article 45(1). The Tribunal
rejected that argument:
There is no room for ambiguity. The Tribunal therefore concludes that the
Russian Federation has consented to be bound — albeit provisionally —
by Article 26 of the ECT by its signature of the ECT. Article 45(1) of the
ECT establishes beyond the shadow of a doubt, and notwithstanding
Article 39 of the ECT, that the Russian Federation and other signatories
agreed that their signature of the Treaty would have the effect of
expressing the consent of the Russian Federation (and each other
signatory) to be provisionally bound by its terms.6
A more difficult question concerned the interplay between ECT Articles 45(1)
and 45(2), and more specifically whether a State could invoke Article 45(1) in a
proceeding brought against it even if it had never made a declaration under Article
45(2). Based on the ordinary meaning of Article 45(1), the Tribunal found the
two provisions to be separate, so that a State’s entitlement to invoke Article 45(1)
did not depend in any way on its having previously invoked Article 45(2).7 The
Tribunal also found more generally that no prior declaration by Russia was
necessary in order for it to invoke Article 45(1).8
Having found that Russia was entitled to invoke Article 45(1), the Tribunal
turned to the meaning of that provision. The Federation argued that, even if
Article 45(1) were applicable, Russia could avoid provisional application of
Article 26 of the ECT Treaty on dispute resolution9 because arbitration of the kind
6

Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL,
PCA Case No. AA 227, http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1176#sthash.c0JvBi98.
dpuf (Nov. 30, 2009), (“Interim award”), para. 382.
7
Interim award, paras. 262-64.
8
Id. para. 284.
9
According to Article 26 ECT:
Settlement of disputes between an Investor and a Contracting Party
1. Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party
relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an
alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be
settled amicably.
2. If such disputes cannot be settled according to the provisions of paragraph 1
within a period of three months from the date on which either party to the dispute
requested amicable settlement, the Investor party to the dispute may choose to
submit it for resolution:
a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party party to the
dispute;
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b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement
procedure; or
c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this Article.
3. a) Subject only to subparagraphs b) and c), each Contracting Party hereby gives its
unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to international arbitration
or conciliation in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
b) (i) The Contracting Parties listed in Annex ID do not give such unconditional
consent where the Investor has previously submitted the dispute under
subparagraph 2a) or b).
(ii) For the sake of transparency, each Contracting Party that is listed in Annex
ID shall provide a written statement of its policies, practices and conditions in
this regard to the Secretariat no later than the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval in accordance with Article
39 or the deposit of its instrument of accession in accordance with Article 41.
c) A Contracting Party listed in Annex IA does not give such unconditional
consent with respect to a dispute arising under the last sentence of Article
10(1).
4. In the event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for resolution under
subparagraph 2 c), the Investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the
dispute to be submitted to:
a) (i) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established
pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States opened for signature at
Washington, 18 March 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the “ICSID
Convention”), if the Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting
Party party to the dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention; or
(ii) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established
pursuant to the Convention referred to in subparagraph a)(i), under the rules
governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by
the Secretariat of the Centre (hereinafter referred to as the “Additional
Facility Rules”), if the Contracting Party of the Investor or the Contracting
Party party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention;
b) a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(hereinafter referred to as “UNCITRAL”); or
c) an arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce.
5. a) The consent given in paragraph 3 together with the written consent of the
Investor given pursuant to paragraph 4 shall be considered to satisfy the
requirement for:
(i) written consent of the parties to a dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the
ICSID Convention and for purposes of the Additional Facility Rules;
(ii) an “agreement in writing” for purposes of article II of the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, done at New York, 10 June 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the
“New York Convention”); and
(iii) “the parties to a contract [to] have agreed in writing” for the purposes of
article 1 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
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of dispute at issue in the Yukos case was inconsistent with Russian law, within the
meaning of Article 45(1). As a consequence, Russia was not subject to the ECT’s
provisional application.
The Federation plainly read the limitation clause in Article 45(1) to mean that
a State can avoid provisional application of any particular provision of the ECT if
it is contrary to Russian law, as the Federation claimed Article 26 was. (The
Tribunal referred to the Federation’s position as the “piecemeal” approach to
Article 45(1).)10 The Claimants took a different view, maintaining that
provisional application could be avoided only if such application were, as a whole,
inconsistent with a State’s constitution, laws or regulations; it would not be
enough that one or more specific provisions of the Treaty were inconsistent with
domestic law. (The Tribunal referred to this as the “all-or-nothing” approach.)11
On this point, the Tribunal agreed with the Claimants, holding that the
Limitation Clause was available only if provisional application of the ECT was,
as such, and in itself, contrary to Russian law. It found that use of the term “this
Treaty,” without further qualification, should, according to its ordinary meaning,
be understood as referring to the Treaty as a whole, and not to merely a part of
it.12 “Either the entire Treaty is applied provisionally, or it is not applied
provisionally at all.”13 The Tribunal thought that allowing a piecemeal invocation
of the Clause would run contrary to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the
b) Any arbitration under this Article shall at the request of any party to the
dispute be held in a state that is a party to the New York Convention. Claims
submitted to arbitration hereunder shall be considered to arise out of a
commercial relationship or transaction for the purposes of article I of that
Convention.
6. A tribunal established under paragraph 4 shall decide the issues in dispute in
accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international
law.
7. An Investor other than a natural person which has the nationality of a Contracting
Party party to the dispute on the date of the consent in writing referred to in
paragraph 4 and which, before a dispute between it and that Contracting Party
arises, is controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party, shall for the
purpose of article 25(2)b) of the ICSID Convention be treated as a “national of
another Contracting State” and shall for the purpose of article 1(6) of the
Additional Facility Rules be treated as a “national of another State.”
8. The awards of arbitration, which may include an award of interest, shall be final
and binding upon the parties to the dispute. An award of arbitration concerning a
measure of a sub-national government or authority of the disputing Contracting
Party shall provide that the Contracting Party may pay monetary damages in lieu
of any other remedy granted. Each Contracting Party shall carry out without delay
any such award and shall make provision for the effective enforcement in its Area
of such awards.
10
Interim award, para. 292.
11
Id. para. 292.
12
Id. paras. 308, 329.
13
Id. para. 311.
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Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), described by the Tribunal as a “cardinal principle of
international law,” which bars a State from invoking its internal legislation as a
justification for failure to perform a treaty obligation.14
The Tribunal then readily concluded that provisional application of the ECT
was not, as a whole, inconsistent with Russia’s “constitution, laws or
regulations.”15 Even the Russian Federation had not maintained otherwise. The
net result was that the Federation was provisionally bound by the ECT up until
August 2009, when it gave notice of its intention not to become a Contracting
Party.
Having so ruled, the Tribunal had no need to inquire into the consistency with
Russian law of the ECT’s Article 26 in particular. However, in light of the
attention the Parties had given to that question, the Tribunal nevertheless
proceeded to address it and to find no inconsistency between the two. It based
that result on a finding that two provisions of the 1991 Russian Law on Foreign
Investments – Article 9, paragraph 2, as well as Article 10 of the 1991 act in its
1999 version – contemplated the arbitration of investor-State disputes, such as
Yukos. Basically, it found that nothing in Russian law excluded the settlement of
disputes between investors and the State through arbitration.16
The Tribunal addressed several further jurisdictional arguments advanced by
the Federation.
Russia had argued that Article 23(2) of the Russian Federal Law on
International Treaties (“FLIT”) requires that a treaty subject to provisional
application be submitted to and ratified by the State Duma within six months from
its signature and the start of its provisional application, and that that had not been
done, with the result that continued provisional application of the ECT would
have been inconsistent with Russian law. The Tribunal dismissed the six-month
limitation period as a mere “internal requirement” incapable of bringing the
ECT’s provisional application to an end in Russia.17
The Federation also invoked Article 17(1), the ECT’s “denial-of-benefits”
clause. That article reserves to each Contracting Party the right to deny the
substantive protections of the ECT to “a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a
third state own or control such entity and if that entity has no substantial business
activities in the area of the Contracting Party in which it is organized.” The
Tribunal found that the challenge went, not to jurisdiction, but to the merits, yet
went ahead and decided the issue in its interim award. Ultimately, it read the
clause literally to merely “reserve” a State’s right to deny benefits to such an
entity, and found that Russia had failed to exercise that right.18

14

Id. paras. 313-14. Article 27 VCLT states: “A party may not invoke the provisions
of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
15
Interim award, paras. 330, 338.
16
Id. para. 370.
17
Id. para. 387.
18
Id. para. 456. Though it was unnecessary to do so, the Tribunal went on to inquire
into whether the requirement for application of Article 17(1) – namely, that the Claimant
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Another threshold objection raised by Russia was the ECT’s so-called
“taxation measures carve-out.” ECT Article 21 provides that, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in [that] Article, nothing in this Treaty shall create rights or
impose obligations with respect to Taxation Measures of the Contracting Parties.”
Finding it unwise to address the applicability of Article 21 “in a vacuum,” the
Tribunal deferred the matter to the merits phase of the proceeding.19
Finally, Russia invoked the ECT’s “fork-in-the road” provision,20 Article
26(3)(b)(i), pursuant to which it was entitled to withhold consent to arbitration if
the investor had previously submitted the dispute to other fora. In fact, the
Claimants had instituted certain Russian court proceedings and also pursued
Russia in the European Court of Human Rights. The Tribunal rejected the
argument on the ground that these proceedings lacked the “triple identity” with the
ECT proceeding – identity of parties, cause of action and object of the dispute –
required for application of the “fork-in-the road” principle.21
Following extensive hearings and numerous procedural orders, the Tribunal
issued an Interim Award upholding its jurisdiction. The Federation did not seek to
annul the Award, and the Tribunal resumed hearings on the merits. Then on July
18, 2014, the Tribunal rendered its Final Award in all three cases. On the merits,
the Tribunal awarded Claimants a total of over $50 billion in damages against the
Federation.22
III. THE ANNULMENT ACTION AND
THE COURT’S STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Russian Federation thereafter filed an action in the Dutch courts for the
annulment of the Interim and Final Awards, as well as costs of the proceedings,
plus interest. Invoking several provisions of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure,
the Federation advanced five grounds for annulment of the Awards, as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

absence of a valid arbitration agreement (sec. 1065(1)(a))
irregularities in the Tribunal’s composition (sec. 1065(1)(b))
excess of arbitral authority (sec. 1065(1)(c))
failure of substantiation (sec. 1065(1)(d))
violation of Dutch public policy due to Tribunal’s partiality and bias (sec.
1065(1)(e))

be owned or controlled by nationals or citizens of third States – was satisfied. The
Tribunal found that it was not. Id. paras. 537, 546.
19
Id. para. 585.
20
ECT, Art. 26(3)(b)(i).
21
Interim award, para. 598.
22
Final Award, Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation,
PCA Case no. AA 227 (July 18, 2014) (“Final award”).
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Thus, the jurisdictional challenge addressed by the court was only one of several
challenges to the award advanced by the Federation.
Before confronting Russia’s jurisdictional arguments, the court determined,
squarely, as an initial matter, that its review of arbitral jurisdiction was to be
conducted on a de novo basis. The court held that, in light of the fundamental
character of the right to access to the courts, it was required, notwithstanding the
doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, to conduct the jurisdictional inquiry
independently.23 This is a proposition with which the Yukos annulment will
always be closely associated.
A. The ECT Limitation Clause
Like the Tribunal, the court focused its attention on ECT Treaty Article 45, and
in particular on the Limitation Clause. As noted, the Claimants had advanced the
argument that Russia was foreclosed from invoking Article 45(1) in the arbitration
because it had failed, upon signing the ECT, to make a declaration under Article
45(2) that it did not consent to the Treaty’s provisional application. Like the
Tribunal before it, the court rejected that argument, finding that Article 45(2) did
not prescribe the sole manner in which the Limitation Clause could be invoked.
“Nothing in the texts of these paragraphs indicates that paragraph 2 is intended as
a procedure rule for the specification of the arrangement in paragraph 1.”24
However, the court then turned to the thorny matter of the proviso’s meaning,
ultimately rejecting the Tribunal’s view that, in order to invoke Article 45(1), a
State must establish that provisional application of the ECT would in itself be
inconsistent with Russian law. The court determined that it was required to give
the term “to the extent” in paragraph 1 of the ECT its meaning in common
parlance, deducing that inconsistency with State law, within the meaning of
Article 45, was a matter of degree and was to be gauged on the basis of individual
treaty provisions.25
Having interpreted Article 45(2) the way it did, the court proceeded to
examine whether the arbitration provision in ECT Article 26, from which the
Tribunal of course derived its competence, was consistent or inconsistent with
Russian law. The Claimants took the position that a provision of the ECT, such as
Article 26, could only be considered as incompatible with Russian law if it
prescribed something that national law prohibited. However, the court took a
different view of “inconsistency”: enforcement of ECT Article 26 would also be
considered as contrary to Russian law if there was no positive legal basis in that
law for dispute settlement through that means, i.e. if the Treaty provision “does
not harmonize with the legal system or is irreconcilable with the starting points
and principles that have been laid down in or can be derived from [a State’s]

23

Judgment, para. 5.4.
Id. para. 1.27. See also id. para. 5.31.
25
Id. paras. 5.11, 5.18.
24
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legislation.”26 A direct contradiction between the Treaty and Russian law need not
be shown.
It still remained, of course, to determine whether ECT Article 26 was actually
inconsistent with Russian law under this standard. On this matter, too, the court
found the Tribunal to have erred. Relying heavily on expert opinions furnished by
the Russian Federation,27 the court concluded that there was no basis in Russian
law for the arbitration of disputes to which the Russian State is a party if the
dispute is of a public law nature unless Russia had consented to such arbitration,
which was of course the very issue in the case.
The Tribunal had found support for the general arbitrability of public law
disputes involving the Russian State in Article 9 of Russia’s 1991 Law on Foreign
Investment. Article 9 states:
(1) Investment disputes, including disputes over the amount, conditions and
procedure of the payment of compensation, shall be resolved by the
Supreme Court of the RSFSR or the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the
RSFSR, unless another procedure is established by an international treaty
in force in the territory of the RSFSR.
(2) Disputes of foreign investors and enterprises with foreign investments
against RSFSR State bodies, disputes between investors and enterprises
with foreign investments involving matters relating to their operations, as
well as disputes between participants of an enterprise with foreign
investments and the enterprise itself shall be resolved by the RSFSR
courts, or, upon agreement of the parties, by an arbitral tribunal, or, in
cases specified by the laws, by authorities authorized to consider
economic disputes.
The court saw matters differently. It concluded that these two paragraphs
designate two distinct classes of disputes. As the court saw it, paragraph 1
encompasses disputes of a public law character (which may be brought only
before State courts, unless a treaty provides otherwise), while paragraph 2
encompasses disputes of a civil, or private, law matter (which may be brought
26

Id. para. 5.33.
Expert reports by Professor A.A. Kostin, who was head of the Private International
and Civil Law Department of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations
(January 2006) and by Professor A.V. Asoskov, who was Professor of the International
Private Law Department of the Russian School of Private Law and Assistant Professor of
the Civil Law Department at M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University (October 2014).
Both experts had demonstrated that Russian legislation made arbitration conditional on the
nature of the dispute and, more particularly that only disputes involving the Russian State
of a civil law character may be arbitrated. They cited, among other pieces of legislation,
Article 21 of the 1992 Arbitrazh Procedure Code (arbitration of “economic” disputes);
Article 1 of the 1992 Provisional Regulation on Arbitral Tribunal for Resolving Economic
Disputes (arbitration of disputes “arising out of civil law relations”); Article 23 of the
1995 Arbitrazh Procedure Code (arbitration of disputes “that arise out of civil law
relations”). Judgment, para. 5.37.
27
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only before State courts, unless an agreement between the parties provides
otherwise). Pursuant to this understanding, the dispute between the Claimants and
the Russian Federation would fall within paragraph 1 and therefore be reserved for
decision by the courts.
The court determined that Article 9 had to be understood in light of a special
Russian enactment known as “The Fundamentals of Legislation,” Article 1 of
which provides that ”[t]he laws of the republics shall regulate in accordance with
these Fundamentals the relations arising in connection with foreign investments in
the republics’ territories, subject to specific features of their economic operations
and investment policy.”28 The relevant provision of the Fundamentals of
Legislation is Article 43 which, like Article 9 itself, distinguishes between two
categories of disputes between foreign investors and the Russian State. According
to that distinction,
(1) Disputes between foreign investors and the State are subject to
consideration in the USSR in courts, unless otherwise provided by
international treaties of the USSR, [while]
(2) Disputes of foreign investors and enterprises with foreign investments
with Soviet State bodies acting as a party to relationships regulated by
civil legislation, enterprises, social organizations and other Soviet legal
entities, disputes between participants of the enterprise with foreign
investments and the enterprise itself are subject to consideration in the
USSR in courts or, upon agreement of the parties, in arbitration
proceedings, inter alia, abroad, and in cases provided by legislative acts of
the Union of SSR and the republics - in arbitrazh courts, economic courts
and others.
This provision – Article 43 of the Fundamentals of Legislation – does clearly
provide that when the State acts in the capacity of a private party (“acting as a
party to relationships regulated by civil legislation”), its disputes with foreign
investors may be decided by arbitral tribunals to whose jurisdiction the parties
agreed. But in other circumstances – notably a public law dispute – the Russian
courts have exclusive jurisdiction, absent a treaty to the contrary. The court thus
essentially carried over the distinction between public law and civil law disputes
of the State from Article 43 of the Fundamentals to Article 9 of the Law on
Foreign Investment.
The Tribunal had also found support for the arbitrability of disputes involving
the Russian State in Article 10 of Russia’s 1991 Law on Foreign Investment, in its
1999 version. According to this article, which does not distinguish between
categories of disputes:
A dispute of a foreign investor arising in connection with its investments
and business activity conducted in the territory of the Russian Federation
shall be resolved in accordance with international treaties of the Russian
28

Judgment, para. 5.44.
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Federation and federal laws in courts, arbitrazh courts or through
international arbitration.
Again, the court disagreed. Although Article 10 makes reference to international
arbitration as a forum for investment disputes, the court did not read it as actually
furnishing a legal basis for the arbitration of such disputes. The court read it,
rather, as permitting the arbitration of investment disputes only in the presence of
a provision to that effect in an international treaty of Russia or Russian legislation.
“Article 10 … makes the option of arbitration conditional on the existence of a
provision in treaties and federal laws to that effect.”29
The court thus concluded overall that neither Article 9 nor Article 10 of the
Law on Foreign Investment sufficed to render ECT Article 26 compatible with
Russian law. ECT Article 26 thus “does not have a legal basis in Russian law and
is incompatible with the starting points laid down in that law.”30
B. Estoppel
The court next considered the Claimants’ argument that the Russian
Federation was, in effect, estopped from denying the consistency of ECT Article
26 with Russian law. The basis for the argument was the fact that, in its 1996
explanatory memorandum to the Russian Parliament urging ratification of the
ECT, the Russian government had made remarks suggesting the absence of any
inconsistency. Those remarks were as follows:
“The provisions of the ECT are consistent with Russian legislation.”
“The legal regime of foreign investments envisaged under the ECT is
consistent with the provisions of the existing Law […] on Foreign
Investment in [Russia], as well as with the amended version of the Law
currently being discussed in the State Duma.”
“[The ECT regime] does not require the acknowledgement of any
concessions or the adoption of any amendments to the abovementioned
Law.”
The court disposed of this argument through reasoning based on the Russian
Constitution and, in particular, its principle of separation of powers set out in
Article 10 of the Constitution:31
[I]n assessing the meaning of the explanatory memorandum the Tribunal
insufficiently recognized that this memorandum originated from the
29

Id. para. 5.56.
Id. para. 5.60.
31
Id. para. 5.77. Article 10 reads: “State power in the Russian Federation shall be
exercised on the basis of its division into legislative, executive and judicial. The
legislative, executive and judicial authorities shall be independent.”
30
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executive and was primarily aimed at prompting the Duma, as part of the
legislature, to ratify the ECT. Since the ECT was never ratified, the
opinion of the executive (the government) cannot be ascribed to the
legislature and the government’s standpoint therefore does not have
independent meaning.32
***
The Constitution and the principle of the separation of powers enshrined
therein preclude a representative of the executive from being able to bind
the Russian Federation to Article 26 ECT.33
***
[T]reaties that deviate from or supplement national Russian laws, cannot
be applied based only on their signature, but require prior ratification. In
accordance with this, these limitations also apply if treaties, like the ECT,
are applied provisionally.34
In sum, in signing the ECT – even with its provisional application feature –
the Russian Federation could not and did not extend to foreign investors an offer
to arbitrate. The Claimants therefore could not, by filing a notice of arbitration,
form an arbitration agreement with Russia, thereby binding Russia to arbitrate
their dispute. The court accordingly concluded that the Tribunal lacked
competence to entertain the underlying claims or issue the resulting award.35 It
ruled in favor of Russia and ordered the Claimants to pay the Russian Federation’s
costs.36
There can be no denying that the court took an extremely close look at every
aspect of the reasoning by which the Tribunal had rejected the Federation’s
jurisdictional challenges, and disagreed with virtually every one of them. The
Yukos judgment is therefore remarkable, not only for the amount of the award
annulled, but also for the very serious scrutiny to which the award was subjected.
The court’s review may well evidence an abiding conviction that questions going
to the authority of an arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate a dispute are those most
worthy of serious judicial attention.

32

Judgment, para. 5.62. Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Constitution states:
The universally-recognized norms of international law and international treaties
and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its legal
system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation
establishes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international
agreement shall be applied.
33
Judgment, para. 5.95.
34
Id.
35
Id. paras. 5.98-99.
36
Id. para. 6.8.
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IV. THE “UNDISCUSSED” QUESTIONS
As noted, the Dutch court had before it several other grounds for annulment of
the Yukos award, some jurisdictional and others non-jurisdictional in nature.
Understandably, it chose to decide the case on one of the jurisdictional grounds,
namely that the Russian Federation never agreed to apply provisionally Article 26
of the ECT because Article 45(1) of the Treaty excludes provisional application of
treaty provisions inconsistent with Russian law, and thus never submitted to
arbitration. Having found reason to annul the award on the ground it did, the
court had no reason to address any of the other challenges mounted by the
Federation in support of annulment, even though the Tribunal had considered and
rejected them all. It left those challenges, to use the court’s own words,
“undiscussed.”37 But though undiscussed, they are of very considerable interest.
A. The Nationality Question
Among the “other” grounds that Russia had advanced was another – quite
common – jurisdictional ground, namely that the claimants were not “investors of
another Contracting Party,” i.e., not nationals of another ECT member state,
defined as “(i) a natural person having the citizenship or nationality of or who is
permanently residing in that Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable
law; [or] (ii) a company or other organization organized in accordance with the
law applicable in that Contracting Party.”38 Russia argued that the purported
investment was in a shell company owned by the host State’s own nationals and,
for that reason, could not be regarded as an “an investor from another Contracting
State,” within the meaning of ECT Article 26. This constituted a jurisdictional
objection because if the Russian Federation’s standing offer to arbitrate in Article
26 was never extended to the Claimants, because they were of the “wrong”
nationality, they were not in a position to accept that offer and produce a binding
arbitration agreement merely by initiating arbitration.
The Tribunal expressed appreciation for this argument, acknowledging that
“[i]f the States that took part in the drafting of the ECT had been asked in the
course of that process whether the ECT was designed to protect – and should be
interpreted and applied to protect – investments in a Contracting State by nationals
of that same Contracting State whose capital derived from the energy resources of
that State, it may well be that the answer would have been in the negative, not
only from the representatives of the Russian Federation but from the generality of
the delegates.”39 Nevertheless, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that, given the
language of the ECT, in order to qualify as a protected “investor,” a company

37

Id. para. 5.100.
ECT, Art. 1(7).
39
Interim Award, para. 434.
38
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need only show that it is organized under the laws of a Contracting State, and
nothing more.40 This remains a controversial proposition.
B. The Right To Be Heard
The Federation also raised several non-jurisdictional challenges, among them
a claim that its right to be heard was violated by the Tribunal’s decision to deviate
from both parties’ submissions on damages, develop and employ a damages
methodology of its own, and at the same time fail to give the parties an
opportunity to comment on that methodology.
This claim too is a serious one. Procedural fairness is essential to the
legitimacy of the arbitral process and the resulting award. International tribunals
have themselves long acknowledged and underscored the importance of the right
to be heard, whether as a matter of sound adjudicatory policy or as a means of
ensuring the validity and enforceability of the eventual award. Disrespect of that
right is accordingly widely available as a basis for annulment of a local award, as
well as for defeating recognition or enforcement of a foreign award.41 An ICSID
annulment committee ruled that it is “fundamental, as a matter of procedure, that
each party is given the right to be heard before an independent and impartial
tribunal.” 42
40

Id. paras. 411, 417. Similarly, the shares in Yukos qualified as a covered
“investment.” Id. para. 434.
41
According to Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention, a court may decline to
recognize or enforce a foreign award when “[t]he party against whom the award is invoked
was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.” See, e.g., Judgment of 8
December 2003, XXIX Y.B. COM. ARB. 834, 839-40 (Swiss Federal Tribunal 2004): “A
foreign decision can be incompatible with the Swiss legal system not only because of its
substantive content, but also because of the procedures that lead to it. In this respect, Swiss
public policy requires compliance with the fundamental principles of procedure, as
deduced from the Constitution, such as the right to a fair process and the right to be
heard.”
See also UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 1985, as revised in 2006, Art. 18 (Equal treatment
of parties): “The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full
opportunity of presenting his case”; UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES 2010, Art. 17:
“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as
it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at an
appropriate stage of the proceedings each party is given a reasonable opportunity of
presenting its case”; ICC ARBITRATION RULES 2012, Art. 22(4): “In all cases, the arbitral
tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and ensure that each party has a reasonable
opportunity to present its case.”
42
Wena Hotels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4,
Annulment Proceedings, Decision, ¶ 57 (Feb. 5, 2002). See also a series of other ICSID
cases: Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Guinea, ICSID Case
No. ARB/84/4, Decision, ¶ 5.06 (Jan. 6, 1988); CDC Group Plc v. Republic of the
Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Annulment Proceedings, Decision, ¶ 49 (June
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It has indeed become a special preoccupation in international practice that
arbitral tribunals refrain from rendering decisions that come as a “surprise” to the
parties because based upon considerations that were extraneous to their
submissions and debate or upon reasoning that they could not reasonably have
anticipated. As stated by another ICSID annulment committee, “It is no answer
to a failure to accord such a right that both parties were equally disadvantaged.”43
Moreover, “once it is shown that there was significant surprise it will usually be
reasonable to assume procedural prejudice in the absence of indications to the
contrary.”44
In arguing that the award should be annulled on the ground that it never knew,
and therefore could never address, the Tribunal’s damages methodology, Russia
advanced a highly plausible basis for annulment of the award.45 Surprise
decisions on remedial issues, such as damages and their calculation, should be
considered as offensive to the right to be heard as surprise decisions on issues of
liability.
C. The Use of Tribunal Secretaries
Among the most interesting and controversial issues that the Dutch court was
spared from deciding in the Yukos case is the proper use by tribunals of tribunal
secretaries. The question arises because a cardinal feature of international
arbitration proceedings is the right of the parties, in an exercise of party
autonomy, to select their arbitrators and define their mandate. In practice, parties
select arbitrators on account of such factors as their personal knowledge,
experience, judgment, reputation, and character, as well as their availability to
serve. The importance of party autonomy in the selection of the arbitrators is
reflected in Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention which authorizes courts
to deny recognition or enforcement of a foreign award if “[t]he composition of the
arbitral authority … was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.” 46

29, 2005) (quoting Wena Hotels); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. And MTD Chile S.A. v.
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Annulment Proceedings, Decision, ¶ 49
(Mar. 21, 2007) (quoting Wena Hotels).
43
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Annulment Proceedings, Decision, ¶ 202 (Dec.
23, 2010). See also GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 145 (2004) (requirement that parties have an opportunity to comment on all
the crucial points of the reasoning that the tribunal intends to adopt).
44
Rotoaira Forest Trust v. Attorney-General, [1999] 2 NZLR 452, 463 (Comm)
(Auckland High Ct.).
45
See, e.g., Paklito Investment Limited v. Klockner East Asia, Ltd, XIX Y.B. COM.
ARB. 664 (HK Sup. Ct. 1993).
46
Encyclopaedia Universalis SA v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 91
(2d Cir. 2005) (stating that “Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention itself suggests
the importance of arbitral composition” and refusing to enforce an award because the
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Irregular composition of the tribunal is also a ground for annulment under the
UNCITRAL Model Law.47 It follows that the mandate of an arbitrator is a personal
one. Thus, the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics, Canon V(C), expressly provides that
“[an] arbitrator should not delegate the duty to decide to any other person.” Legal
scholars unanimously and uniformly subscribe to the view that, as one authority has
expressed it, “In accepting appointment, an arbitrator necessarily accepts a duty not
to delegate that mandate.”48 As Gary Born has put the matter, “a central premise of
the role of the secretary is that he or she may not assume the tribunal’s or (an
arbitrator’s) functions and may not influence the tribunal’s decision.”49 The
institutional rules and guidance notes are virtually all to the same effect.50
tribunal did not “comport with [the] agreement’s requirements for how arbitrators are
selected”).
47
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, Art. 34.
48
Constantine Partasides, The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals
in International Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 147, 147 (2002).
49
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2000 (2d ed. 2014).
50
Among such rules and guidance notes are the following:
(a) UNCITRAL, Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings 1996, ¶ 27:
“To the extent the tasks of the secretary are purely organizational (e.g. obtaining
meeting rooms and providing or coordinating secretarial services), this is usually not
controversial. Differences in views, however, may arise if the tasks include legal research
and other professional assistance to the arbitral tribunal (e.g. collecting case law or
published commentaries on legal issues defined by the arbitral tribunal, preparing
summaries from case law and publications, and sometimes also preparing drafts of
procedural decisions or drafts of certain parts of the award, in particular those concerning
the facts of the case). Views or expectations may differ especially where a task of the
secretary is similar to professional functions of the arbitrators. Such a role of the secretary
is in the view of some commentators inappropriate or is appropriate only under certain
conditions, such as that the parties agree thereto. However, it is typically recognized that it
is important to ensure that the secretary does not perform any decision-making function of
the arbitral tribunal.”
(b) ICC, Note on the Appointment, Duties and Remuneration of Administrative
Secretaries, ¶ 2:
“An Administrative Secretary may perform organizational and administrative tasks
such as: transmitting documents and communications on behalf of the Arbitral Tribunal;
organizing and maintaining the Arbitral Tribunal’s file and locating documents;
organizing hearings and meetings; attending hearings, meetings and deliberations; taking
notes or minutes or keeping time; conducting legal or similar research; and proofreading
and checking citations, dates and cross-references in procedural orders and awards as well
as correcting typographical, grammatical or calculation errors.
Under no circumstances may the Arbitral Tribunal delegate decision-making
functions to an Administrative Secretary. Nor should the Arbitral Tribunal rely on the
Administrative Secretary to perform any essential duties of an arbitrator.
…
A request by an Arbitral Tribunal to an Administrative Secretary to prepare written
notes or memoranda shall in no circumstances release the Arbitral Tribunal from its duty
personally to review the file and/or to draft any decision of the Arbitral Tribunal.”
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It is of course common arbitral practice around the world, especially in
investor-State arbitration, for tribunals to employ secretaries to assist them in
administering arbitral proceedings. As the term “secretary” suggests, such an
individual is generally meant to perform tasks of an essentially administrative
character, and it is so understood. In fact, the title applied to Mr. Valasek in this
case was not “secretary,” but “assistant,” a term of no particular meaning in the
arbitration context. It is difficult to tell from this term alone the functions that a
person can be expected to perform. Whatever the nomenclature, however, the
personal nature of the arbitrator’s mandate, as described above, necessarily
imposes limits on a tribunal’s use of arbitral secretaries or, to the extent they are
employed, arbitral assistants.
Of particular concern in this connection is the role, if any, of arbitral
secretaries in producing early drafts of an award. The prevailing view is that, if a
secretary engages in any drafting, it should be limited to non-substantive portions
of an award (such as portions of an award that identify the parties and counsel,
identify the applicable law or language of the arbitration, or recite the basic
(c) LCIA, Frequently Asked Questions, What is the LCIA’s position on the
appointment of Secretaries to Tribunals:
“The duties of the administrative secretary should neither conflict with those for
which the parties are paying the LCIA Secretariat, nor constitute any delegation of the
Tribunal’s authority.…
Administrative secretaries should, therefore, confine their activities to such matters as
organizing papers for the Tribunal, highlighting relevant authorities, maintaining factual
chronologies, keeping the Tribunal’s time sheets and so on.”
(d) HKIAC, Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (June 1,
2014), Arts. 3.4, 3.6: “Unless the parties agree or the arbitral tribunal directs otherwise, a
tribunal secretary may provide the following assistance to the arbitral tribunal, provided
that the arbitral tribunal ensures that the secretary does not perform any decision-making
function or otherwise influence the arbitral tribunal’s decisions in any manner:
(a) conducting legal or similar research; collecting case law or published
commentaries on legal issues defined by the arbitral tribunal; checking on legal
authorities cited by the parties to ensure that they are the latest authorities on the
subject matter of the parties’ submissions;
(b) researching discrete questions relating to factual evidence and witness testimony;
(c) preparing summaries from case law and publications as well as producing
memoranda summarizing the parties’ respective submissions and evidence;
(d) locating and assembling relevant factual materials from the records as instructed
by the arbitral tribunal;
(e) attending the arbitral tribunal’s deliberations and taking notes; and
(f) preparing drafts of non-substantive letters for the arbitral tribunal and nonsubstantive parts of the tribunal’s orders, decisions and awards (such as procedural
histories and chronologies of events).
…
A request by the arbitral tribunal to a tribunal secretary to prepare notes, memoranda
or drafts shall in no circumstances release the arbitral tribunal from its duty personally
to review the relevant files and materials, and to draft any substantive parts of its
orders, decisions and awards.”
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procedural history of the case). Michael Hwang, for example, considers it proper
for secretaries to perform the following tasks, and only those tasks:
(1) handle all secretarial and administrative matters in the absence of an
institution.
(2) communicate with the parties under the supervision of the Tribunal
(through its Chairman).
(3) proof-read procedural orders and award(s) that may be rendered by the
Tribunal.
(4) check on legal authorities cited by Counsel to ensure that they are up to
date and most relevant to the subject matter of Counsel’s submissions
(any new cases unearthed by the Legal Assistant will be referred to the
Parties for their comments).
(5) assemble or locate relevant factual materials from the record as instructed
by the Tribunal.
(6) prepare a first draft of the formal or uncontroversial parts of any decision
or award that may be rendered by the Tribunal (e.g., procedural history
and chronology of events).51
Other leading scholars and practitioners echo that same view.52 According to
Professor Klaus Peter Berger, it is not sufficient that the Tribunal subsequently
reviews the award and edits it:
As a general rule, the drafting of the substantive parts of the final award,
which include its operative part, must be reserved for the arbitral tribunal.
It is particularly in this substantive section where writing one’s own text
instead of reading the text prepared by someone else remains the ultimate
means of intellectual control of the tribunal’s decision of the dispute as
the essential tool for safeguarding the proper performance of the
arbitrators’ personal decision-making duty owed to the parties that have
appointed them, thereby preserving the integrity of the arbitral process as
such.53
51

Michael Hwang, Introduction: Musings on International Arbitration, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 16 (SIAC 2013) (emphasis added).
52
See Thomas Clay, Le secrétaire arbitral, REV. ARB. 953-55 (2005):
[I]t does not seem to me acceptable that the arbitral secretary participates in the
deliberations or is entrusted with the task of drafting a procedural order or award,
even a partial award (my translation from the French original).
53
KLAUS PETER BERGER, Part III, 27th Scenario: Deliberation of the Tribunal and
Rendering of the Award, in PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 613-42, at 625, para. 27-19 (3d rev. ed.
2015) (emphasis in original).
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***
Even a careful review by an arbitrator of a secretary’s first draft does not
entirely remove the scope given to the secretary to make judgements as to
what to emphasize and what to omit, judgements that the arbitrator
reviewing the draft may not even by able to identify never mind control.
The act of writing is the ultimate safeguard of intellectual control. An
arbitrator should be reluctant to relinquish it.54
According to a 2015 survey of international arbitrators and practitioners
conducted by Queen Mary University of London (in conjunction with White &
Case LLP), and based on 763 questionnaire responses and 105 in-person
interviews, over 87% of survey respondents opposed having arbitral secretaries
prepare drafts of substantive parts of the awards or even discuss the merits of the
dispute with the arbitrators.55 Similar surveys of international arbitrators decidedly
reflect that same consensus.56
This is not, of course, to say that parties cannot agree to more extensive
participation by arbitral secretaries than the prevailing view allows. The principle
of party autonomy clearly so suggests. But this presupposes that the parties are
made aware in advance that the Tribunal will follow such practices, and give their
assent.
The question raised before the Dutch court was whether the Tribunal in Yukos
had observed these widely agreed upon disciplines. There is reason to believe, at
least based on information on hours57 and fees58 made available by the PCA, that
54

Partasides, supra note 48, at 158.
2015 Queen Mary/White & Case International Arbitration Survey, pp. 42-44.
56
See Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the
Committee on Arbitration of the New York City Bar Association which found in a survey
of a small number of highly prominent international arbitrators that:
(a) 14 respondents considered it proper to use secretaries only for “organization of the
documents in the file, the drafting of letters regarding scheduling and procedural
matters, and the preparation and minutes of hearings,”
(b) 11 respondents considered it proper to use secretaries for drafting purposes only in
connection with “non-substantive” portions of the award, such as “the procedural
history of the arbitration, the description of the parties, and sometimes also the
summary of the parties’ contentions,” and
(c) two respondents would “refuse to assign any drafting responsibilities to the
secretary,” while
(d) only three Respondents would permit secretaries to prepare a first draft of the
award.
Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee
on Arbitration of the New York City Bar Association, Secretaries to International
Arbitration Tribunals, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 575, 585 (2006).
57
According to the PCA’s Statement of Account, over the life of the proceedings, Mr.
Valasek performed 3006.2 hours of work, a figure greatly in excess of the number of hours
any members of the Tribunal had spent. The difference was particularly pronounced for
the specific period between close of the hearings and rendition of the award.
55
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Mr. Valasek’s role in the arbitration extended considerably further,59 so much so
that, had the Dutch court addressed the matter, it is likely to have found the
situation deeply problematic.
V. CONCLUSION
The Yukos annulment is in itself a matter of moment, and for reasons other
than the magnitude of the award and the fact that the rendering court is
especially sophisticated in international arbitration, and increasingly so in
investor-State arbitration, given the PCA’s presence in the Hague. The ruling is
emblematic of the view that, while national courts rightly defer to arbitral
tribunals on the merits of a dispute, they should be less solicitous on the
question of whether parties ever agreed to arbitrate. Arguably, this concern
arises with particular emphasis in investor-State arbitration. The judgment is,
in this regard, especially remarkable, for the court engaged in truly searching de
novo review on all aspects of jurisdiction.
Momentous though it may be, the judgment left unaddressed numerous
issues that are certainly no less important and, in some cases, a great deal more
central to, or controversial in, the world of international arbitration. They will
likely resurface in the Dutch appellate proceedings that will ensue and in award
enforcement proceedings that the Claimants have brought. In any event, these
are matters to which national courts, at some undetermined time in the future,
will return. Even in the meantime, they warrant serious reflection

58

The Final Award shows that Mr. Valasek billed in excess of US 1 million (EUR
970,562.50) in connection with his role as assistant to the Tribunal. Final Award, para.
1863.
59
Evidently the Russian Federation produced a report by a forensic expert affirming,
based on the expert’s research, that it was “extremely likely” that Mr. Valasek wrote the
majority of at least three major sections of the Final Awards, namely, 78.57% of the
Preliminary Objections section, 65.38% of the Liability section and 71.43% of the
Quantification of Claimant’s Damages. See Carole Chaski, Expert Report Regarding
Authorship of the Final Award dated September 11, 2015, para. 7.

